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Summary 
 
This thesis explores the British government‘s approach to international negotiations 
concerning nuclear weapons during Harold Wilson‘s first two terms of office (1964-1970). 
It focuses on three distinct but interrelated strands of British nuclear diplomacy: ‗hardware 
solutions‘, the sharing of nuclear weapons between states in the form of a multilateral 
force; ‗software solutions‘, non-physical measures of cooperation, such as consultative 
and planning arrangements, between alliance members; and a global non-proliferation 
treaty. In looking at how and why these interrelated policies evolved, this thesis considers 
party, domestic and international influences on decision-making within the government. It 
pays particular attention to political and economic events, building on existing diplomatic 
and strategic accounts of the period. 
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Introduction 
 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson suffered many disappointments in his first two terms of 
office. The devaluation of the pound, the retreat from global defence commitments, and 
the failure to achieve membership of the European Economic Community overshadowed 
much of his premiership. Wilson‘s occasionally disingenuous explanations of these 
misfortunes, coupled with a raft of unfulfilled domestic promises, encouraged little 
sympathy for the plight of his government. Perhaps most damning of all was the 
scepticism in British politics that these two terms engendered.
1
 These ignominies, 
however, should not obscure a considerable record of achievement in international 
negotiations concerning nuclear weapons. Indeed, under Wilson, British nuclear 
diplomacy enjoyed much success. 
By the close of 1968, the Labour government had signed and ratified the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A little over a year later, the Treaty came into 
force, marking an important step towards a world with fewer nuclear weapon states. 
Preceding this historic feat was another. In 1966, Britain became one of the founding 
members of the Nuclear Planning Group. The United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, 
and three rotating members, would share decision-making on nuclear policy in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. These achievements had been realised with no diminution to 
Britain‘s own nuclear status. Under Wilson, the Labour government had successfully 
resisted international pressure to share British nuclear weapons with other governments. 
Each of these achievements had been fraught with difficulty. Changing domestic and 
international circumstances repeatedly affected the content and conduct of policy-making. 
Nevertheless, Wilson‘s keen exploitation of events at home and abroad ensured that the 
course of British nuclear diplomacy evolved in the direction he had envisaged. 
This thesis is concerned with understanding how and why British nuclear 
diplomacy changed during Harold Wilson‘s time as Prime Minister between 1964 and 
1970. It focuses on three distinct but interrelated strands of British nuclear diplomacy: 
‗hardware solutions‘, the sharing of nuclear weapons between states in the form of a 
multilateral nuclear force; ‗software solutions‘, non-physical measures of nuclear weapons 
cooperation, such as consultative and planning arrangements, between alliance members; 
                                                 
1
 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The office and its holders since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, the 
Penguin Press, 2000), 288; Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London: 
Hamish Hamilton 1989). 
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and a global non-proliferation treaty. This thesis suggests that British nuclear diplomacy 
was not one consistent policy. Change reflected competition and cooperation between the 
pursuit of hardware solutions, software solutions and a non-proliferation treaty, all of 
which vied against the broader and shifting objectives of the Labour government. To be 
sure, wider international and domestic considerations encouraged Wilson to exert a degree 
of flexibility in the pursuit of all of his diplomatic objectives vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. 
Introducing a collection of his speeches published in 1964, Wilson describes his 
task as Prime Minister as that of conducting a mighty orchestra, attempting to harmonise 
and integrate domestic and international affairs.
2
 George Brown, Wilson‘s third Foreign 
Secretary, reaches a similar conclusion in his own memoirs. ‗The fact of the matter is that 
Foreign Affairs, whether for Britain or any other nation, are not just a catalogue of 
unconnected events‘, Brown explains, continuing, ‗They are a kaleidoscope of inter-
related pieces, all of which must somehow be juggled with, virtually at the same time and 
certainly in relation to each other.‘3 British nuclear diplomacy was a series of 
compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations. 
Cabinet discussion, financial crises, and international tensions all influenced nuclear 
policy-making in the two Labour governments of this period. This thesis is an account of 
Wilson and the Labour government‘s attempts to balance these disparate, and at times 
competing, influences in the context of British nuclear diplomacy. 
 
Historiography 
Britain became an increasingly marginal economic and military actor on the world stage 
during Wilson‘s premiership. This decline stood in stark contrast to the dominance of the 
superpowers and the growing influence of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Nevertheless, Britain still had an important, albeit lesser, international role. There is a rich 
and expanding body of historical literature considering British diplomacy and foreign 
policy at this time. John Young has produced a masterful account of Labour‘s 
international policy in the 1960s.
4
 There is also a plethora of more focused studies, 
considering events ‗East of Suez‘, Britain‘s pursuit of membership of the EEC, the growth 
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of détente and relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
5
 All of these 
studies touch on the issue of nuclear weapons.  
There is, of course, a considerable literature on British nuclear history itself. The 
post-war period in particular has attracted considerable attention.
6
 The research 
specifically considering British nuclear diplomacy in the 1960s continues to grow and 
develop. Historians interested in hardware solutions have focused on the Multilateral 
Force (MLF) and the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), both of which attempted to 
reorganise NATO‘s nuclear arrangements. These hardware solutions dominated the 
content and conduct of British nuclear diplomacy in Wilson‘s first period of office. Some 
scholars have suggested that Wilson‘s concept of the ANF was a cynical attempt to 
extricate Britain from hardware solutions or, as it was also termed, ‗nuclear sharing‘ 
commitments.
7
 Conversely, newer research suggests this was a serious diplomatic 
initiative by the new Labour government.
8
 There are elements of truth in both arguments. 
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Although having intentions beyond merely scuppering the MLF, the ANF was only ever a 
more palatable variation of a still largely unpopular idea. When the opportunity presented 
itself, as argued in chapters two and three of this thesis, Wilson cautiously moved away 
from such proposals and patiently awaited the collapse of international negotiations on 
hardware solutions. 
Tied into the failure of hardware solutions, and influencing British nuclear 
diplomacy throughout Wilson‘s two terms of office, were software solutions and the 
pursuit of a non-proliferation treaty. Historians concerned with the former suggest that the 
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was a US invention, which Britain ultimately supported in 
an attempt to help ease tensions within NATO.
9
 Although accurate, the NPG also played a 
significant role in facilitating non-proliferation negotiations and the decline of nuclear 
sharing. Software solutions, as shown in chapter four, were therefore essential to 
explaining the evolution of British nuclear diplomacy and much of its success.  
The Labour government‘s commitment to realising the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was steadfast and extended from 1964 to 1970. 
Despite this commitment, some historians suggest that Britain was of minimal significance 
to the intensive phase of negotiations.
10
 Others, however, argue that Britain‘s role in the 
non-proliferation negotiations was important, and directly influenced the US.
11
 The final 
chapter of this thesis claims that Britain‘s influence varied throughout the negotiations. 
The Labour government was unable to influence the superpowers, and often unwilling to 
influence the actions of the non-nuclear weapon states. 
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Contribution 
This thesis makes four original contributions to the existing literature on British nuclear 
diplomacy between 1964 and 1970. First, the thesis explores hardware solutions, software 
solutions, and a non-proliferation treaty as interwoven, rather than separate, components 
of British nuclear diplomacy. Beyond integrating separate bodies of historical research, 
this focus helps to reveal the interconnected nature of events and encourages broader 
conclusions about nuclear policy-making within the Labour government. Under Wilson, 
British nuclear diplomacy was simultaneously characterised by success and irrelevance. 
The failure of hardware solutions and the realisation of the NPT meant that the Labour 
government achieved its key objectives. Yet, these successes were often more to do with 
superpower negotiations than the actions of Wilson or his government. Finally, an 
interwoven approach also facilitates a wider analysis of domestic and international 
influences on the Labour government, many of which had previously appeared 
unimportant or unrelated. 
Indeed, this thesis‘ second contribution comes from its interest in the British 
economy. Efforts to reduce defence expenditure and anxiety about economic performance 
certainly influenced the conduct and content of British nuclear diplomacy. The ANF, for 
example, had a serious economic purpose beyond merely scuppering the MLF. In the early 
months of taking office, the Labour government repeatedly discussed contributing its own 
nuclear weapons to the ANF in exchange for military concessions from the US. By 
exploring the economic dimensions of British nuclear diplomacy, it is possible to 
complement, and often improve on, existing diplomatic and strategic accounts of the 
period. Consequently, this thesis pays particular attention to the growing collection of 
work considering the British economy in this period, and seeks to integrate it into a study 
of the Labour government‘s handling of nuclear diplomacy.12  
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The third contribution is a greater consideration of the relationship between the 
Labour government‘s desire for membership of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and British nuclear diplomacy. This thesis therefore pays particular attention to the 
growing collection of work considering Britain‘s second application for membership of 
the EEC.
13
 Wilson‘s interest in membership was limited to the later stages of his time in 
office. Nevertheless, an interest in the EEC strengthens existing accounts of British 
nuclear history that have focused on the Cold War or US-UK relations. Wilson often 
adopted a secondary role in negotiations on the NPT and repeatedly left the running to the 
superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the EEC, who were 
resentful of the Treaty‘s discriminatory terms, which, in turn, helped to protect Britain‘s 
application for membership. 
The final contribution comes from a closer examination of Wilson and his own 
attempts to balance competing interests within the government vis-à-vis British nuclear 
diplomacy. Although reaching familiar conclusions about his style of leadership, this 
thesis nevertheless provides a more detailed account of his handling of nuclear policy. He 
was a skilful, forceful and often devious politician. Wilson, for example, was instrumental 
in managing the government to support the continuation of Britain‘s nuclear weapons 
programme. He did so by cautiously gathering support beforehand, directly controlling the 
flow of information available to the Cabinet, and exploiting his small majority to 
encourage cooperation. Crucially, though, he was also a pragmatist. Wilson often modified 
the content and conduct of British nuclear diplomacy in response to a wide array of 
competing domestic and international interests. 
Although focused on decision-making at the highest level, often in the context of 
international negotiations, this thesis does recognise the context of decision-making within 
the government. Discord in the Labour Party, Cabinet debate, and interdepartmental 
rivalries all form an important context to the development of British nuclear diplomacy. 
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There is an abundance of memoirs and diaries from all levels of the Labour government.
14
 
Added to these is a collection of biographies concerned with many of the key participants, 
particularly Wilson.
15
 Also useful are the selection of books concerned with British 
government, Cabinet and Whitehall more broadly in this period.
16
 It is curious why so few 
international historians consider the influences from within the government, particularly in 
comparison to more familiar ‗external‘ stimuli. Politicians, civil servants, and institutions 
construct policy as an interpretation of, and reaction to, domestic and international events. 
Although wide in scope, this thesis has clearly defined parameters. It considers the 
development of British nuclear diplomacy with respect to the governments of the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Germany. This decision reflects the 
disproportionately high levels of influence that these countries had on the nuclear policies 
of the Labour government. Moreover, interest in US-UK nuclear relations appreciates the 
more frequent contact between the Labour Party and US officials, and the wealth of 
readily available archival documentation on both sides of the Atlantic. For the purposes of 
focus and brevity, it is necessary but regrettable that nuclear relations with other countries, 
including France, the Soviet Union and India, do not feature more prominently.  
Furthermore, this thesis seeks to make its contribution by exploring the political 
and economic dimensions of British nuclear diplomacy. It is, of course, important to 
recognise the wider strategic and military backdrop to events. Events within NATO, 
Britain‘s global military commitments, and the Cold War context are critical elements in 
the study of British nuclear diplomacy. Nonetheless, this thesis is not a strategic or 
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military history and does not dwell on the mechanics, planning, or intelligence 
surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. This thesis instead contributes to British nuclear 
history by exploring the fields of politics and economics, utilising a raft of available but 
often overlooked sources. 
 
Sources and methodology 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the study of British political history, and, more 
specifically, nuclear diplomacy. It follows a well-trodden methodological path, comprising 
research, analysis and interpretation.
17
 This thesis critically examines, and then 
triangulates, archival materials and existing literature to develop a sophisticated analysis 
of the past. It utilises a wide array of state and private papers. The majority of source 
materials come from the National Archives in London, including Prime Ministerial, 
Cabinet, Treasury, Defence and Foreign Office documents released under ‗the thirty-year 
rule‘.18 This thesis also draws from the Labour Party archive and a selection of private 
papers, venturing to a number of smaller archives housing these collections.
19
 As this 
thesis is concerned with British perceptions and policy-making, British documents are the 
principal focus of its research.  
Nevertheless, additional material from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential 
Library and the US National Archives in Maryland is extremely useful in revealing more 
about British perceptions and policies hitherto overlooked by, or absent from, the existing 
body of literature or British archives. The collection of US documents found in the 
Foreign Relations of the United States book series, published by the Office of the 
                                                 
17
 Perhaps the single best study of the historical method is Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International 
History: A Guide to Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Two classic texts on the subject 
are still useful: G.R. Elton, The Practice of History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, second edition); E.H. Carr, 
What is History? (London: Penguin, 1987 second edition). A helpful guide to the broader challenges 
surrounding the study of history can be found in Richard J. Evans, In defence of history (London: Granta, 
1997).  
18
 In 1967, the Wilson government established legislation to reduce the ‗fifty-year rule‘ to thirty years, a 
policy that was implemented in 1972. The rule refers to the Public Record Office (PRO) in London, which 
houses a vast archive of national documents. At the beginning of each year, it publishes official papers that 
the government has kept secret for the past thirty years. Importantly, though, even after the New Year, some 
sensitive documents remain secret. Parliament‘s decision to pass the Freedom of Information Act in 2000, 
which went live in 2005, has supplemented this rule by creating a statutory right for people to obtain internal 
documents held by public authorities. For a fascinating discussion on this topic, see Peter Hennessy and 
Chris Westcott, ‗The last right? Open government, Freedom of Information and the Right to Know‘, 
Strathclyde Analysis Papers 12 (Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 1992). 
19
 This thesis explores the private papers of Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, George Brown, Barbara 
Castle, Michael Stewart, and Patrick Gordon Walker. 
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Historian in the United States Department of State, is similarly useful.
20
 This thesis also 
draws on, albeit second hand, research conducted in the West German archives.
21
 
Although likely to have been of comparatively less value, it is still regrettable that former 
Soviet archives remain largely closed to the public at this time. In support of this wide 
array of archival documentation, this thesis draws on a wealth of secondary sources and 
several interviews. The triangulation of data helps to overcome archival omissions and is 
essential in producing a more nuanced contribution to the existing historiography.  
 
Overview 
This thesis contains five chapters, divided thematically and ordered broadly 
chronologically. Each chapter focuses on one particular strand of British nuclear 
diplomacy, whether hardware solutions, software solutions, or a non-proliferation 
agreement. As this thesis is, inter alia, an attempt to combine these previously disparate 
policy strands, it recognises the need for some overlap in order to avoid a restrictively 
narrow analysis. Each chapter seeks to explore how and why British nuclear diplomacy 
evolved under Wilson‘s leadership.  
Chapter one, ‗The ambiguities of opposition‘, explores the twenty-month period 
between Wilson becoming Leader of the Opposition in February 1963 and the General 
Election of October 1964. It considers how Wilson balanced his own approach to nuclear 
diplomacy with the demands of the Labour Party and broader domestic and international 
constraints. Nuclear weapons had been a tremendously divisive issue within the Labour 
Party. As Leader of the Opposition, Wilson sought to satisfy the needs of the party, which 
often came at the expense of a more conciliatory negotiating position with Washington. 
He was, at this time, more concerned with party unity, rather than transatlantic 
commitments on which he had little influence. Wilson could address international issues 
when he took office; if he failed to win the next election it would not be his problem. 
Thus, in discussions with foreign officials, he vigorously contested any future 
commitments to nuclear sharing, and cast doubt on Britain‘s future as a nuclear power. 
International pressures, specifically the fear of an exclusive nuclear alliance between 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and US, and thus West German access to nuclear 
weapons, eventually led Wilson to produce some subtle caveats to his negotiating position 
                                                 
20
 FRUS, however, often provides edited versions of documents which can disadvantage the historian: Marc 
Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 146-162. 
21
 Macintyre, Anglo-German relations; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon. 
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with Washington. Yet, to his domestic audience, he repeatedly downplayed his own 
diplomatic prudence. In contrast to his private approach to nuclear diplomacy, Wilson‘s 
public position was far more ambivalent and intentionally ambiguous. Claims that he 
could not make a final decision on the future of the Polaris programme, and consequently 
nuclear sharing, until he was in power provided a convenient way in which to criticise the 
Conservative government and keep the Labour Party united, without necessarily 
committing to cancellation. Wilson‘s criticisms of the Polaris programme also 
complemented the Labour Party‘s broader efforts to highlight the Conservative 
government‘s perceived mishandling of the national economy. 
The second and third chapters, ‗Constructing the Atlantic Nuclear Force‘ and ‗The 
recurring death of nuclear sharing‘, both consider hardware solutions between 1964 and 
1967. Building on the issues explored in the preceding chapter, Wilson oversaw the 
creation of the ANF as a more palatable replacement to the widely unpopular MLF. 
Although its principal objective was to address the MLF problem, the ANF became a 
serious proposal that sought to improve broader international nuclear relations and 
facilitate measures of non-proliferation. Moreover, much of the government initially 
perceived the ANF as an effective method with which to secure future military and 
economic concessions from NATO and the United States. Specifically, in return for a 
commitment of Polaris submarines or V-bombers, Wilson sought the release of a 
substantial number of conventional forces presently committed to Western Europe. These 
potential concessions were especially valuable given the precarious situation of the pound, 
a significant balance of payments deficit, and a commitment to greater defence 
rationalisation. Moreover, from a domestic and party perspective, the ANF served as a 
valuable instrument for Wilson to justify the preservation of the Polaris programme 
without harming party unity or undermining his slim parliamentary majority. 
Nevertheless, the ANF was only ever a more acceptable version of a still widely 
unpopular idea. Once Wilson had secured approval from the Cabinet and US President 
Lyndon Johnson to pursue this proposal, progress swiftly dissipated. Throughout 1965, the 
government subtly extricated itself from its commitment to hardware solutions, and 
instead pursued software solutions and a non-proliferation treaty. Broader international 
and domestic concerns, however, tempered Wilson‘s resistance to nuclear sharing. US 
support for the pound, growing tensions with the FRG on the costs of military cooperation 
in Europe, and fears of a MLF revival meant that formal support for the ANF remained 
prudent. The government‘s stance on nuclear sharing was thus characterised by public 
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support for the ANF, but procrastination and equivocation in private. Consequently, the 
ANF proposal, effectively lifeless within the government itself, lingered on the 
international landscape for several more years. 
Chapter four, ‗Cooperation as consultation‘, looks in more detail at the emergence 
of software solutions in British nuclear diplomacy between 1965 and 1967. Despite initial 
reservations, the Labour government largely welcomed US proposals for greater 
consultation between the allies in the form of the Nuclear Planning Working Group 
(NPWG), later supplanted by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The proposal 
complemented the dual objectives of removing hardware solutions from the international 
political landscape and progressing non-proliferation negotiations. Responsibility for the 
success of this software solution, however, rested largely with the superpowers. In a series 
of private negotiations designed to improve the ailing non-proliferation negotiations, a 
compromise emerged. The Soviet Union tacitly agreed to relinquish its objections to 
software solutions, specifically the NPG. In exchange, the US agreed to forego any further 
commitment to hardware solutions, such as the MLF and ANF. The US subsequently used 
the offer of a permanent seat on the NPG to convince the FRG to forego its increasingly 
unrealistic ambitions for a hardware solution. 
Due to its exclusion from these private negotiations, the Labour government 
played a secondary role in overcoming the international difficulties surrounding the 
possession and control of nuclear weapons. Wilson remained unwilling to denounce the 
ANF formally. This stance reflected his unease about upsetting his US creditors, and 
lingering fears about the possibility of a future NATO nuclear force that could exclude 
British participation. Persisting difficulties over the costs of British forces stationed in 
West Germany, and a growing interest in membership of the EEC, only strengthened 
Wilson‘s reluctance to press the issue. It was therefore private superpower negotiations 
and France‘s withdrawal from NATO‘s integrated command structure that helped to 
facilitate closer collaboration in matters of nuclear cooperation within the alliance. Thus, 
between 1965 and 1967, Britain enjoyed significant progress in both nuclear consultation 
and non-proliferation largely because of the actions of other states. 
Chapter five, ‗Non-proliferation diplomacy', explores the later stages of the British 
government‘s pursuit of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Following re-election in March 
1966, growing economic and political pressures encouraged Wilson to pursue membership 
of the EEC. By 1967, a desire for entry into the EEC had become a major influence on the 
content and conduct of British nuclear non-proliferation policy. Wilson intentionally 
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embraced a secondary role in the negotiation process, leaving the running to the 
superpowers, in order to avoid conflict with the countries of EEC and thereby protect 
Britain‘s application for membership. Although failing to achieve membership in 1967, a 
commitment to future entry continued to influence non-proliferation policy in the 
following years. Indeed, alongside giving renewed impetus to the NPT, a desire for future 
entry into the EEC helps to explain the British government‘s decision to become the first 
nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.  
This chapter also challenges the pervading assumption that the decision to sign and 
later ratify the Treaty was uncontested within the British government. Instead, some 
ministers harboured serious reservations about the consequences of the Treaty on Britain‘s 
nascent relations with the EEC. Tensions between these foreign policy objectives surfaced 
in sporadic arguments between ministers at the highest levels of government. Despite his 
own increasingly precarious political situation, Wilson successfully managed the passage 
of the Treaty through his own government. The NPT codified the death of nuclear sharing 
and, more importantly, Britain‘s legal existence as one of only a small number of nuclear 
weapon states. Taken together, these five chapters reveal how and why British nuclear 
diplomacy evolved under Wilson‘s leadership, as he struggled to balance his own 
objectives against wider domestic and international forces. 
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Appendix 
 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the ―Parties to the Treaty‖, 
 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent 
need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of 
peoples, 
 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, 
 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an 
agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
 
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
on peaceful nuclear activities, 
 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the 
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding 
effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at 
certain strategic points, 
 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any 
technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear 
explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-
weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, 
 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other 
States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, 
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test 
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, 
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Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order 
to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing 
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery 
pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and 
maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of 
the world's human and economic resources, 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
ARTICLE I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices. 
 
ARTICLE II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. 
 
ARTICLE III 
1. Each Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an 
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with 
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the 
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to 
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or 
special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility 
or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or 
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
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2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production 
of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or 
special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 
 
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article 
IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or 
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of 
nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful 
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the 
Preamble of the Treaty. 
 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in 
accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements 
shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their 
instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall 
commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than 
eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
 
ARTICLE IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty 
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and 
in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in. the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in 
contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of 
the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 
 
ARTICLE V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this 
Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, 
potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties 
for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and 
development. Non nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to 
a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate 
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representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as 
possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may 
also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
 
ARTICLE VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 
 
ARTICLE VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure 
the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. 
 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment 
shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. 
Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties 
to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the 
Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 
 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other 
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its 
instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a 
majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of 
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other 
Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 
 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in 
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes 
of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter. a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary 
Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the 
Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 
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2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby 
designated the Depositary Governments. 
 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are 
designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclearweapon State is one which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967. 
 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force 
of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 
 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each 
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into 
force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 
 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
 
ARTICLE X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty 
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of 
the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide 
whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or 
periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty. 
 
19 
 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand 
nine hundred and sixty-eight. 
 
* * * 
 
The above text reproduces the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as originally provided 
by the Depositary Governments on 22 April 1970.  
 
It appears on the IAEA website. Last accessed 15 July 2010.  
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf  
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